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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff'Appellee.
v.
LESLIE GENE LOYA. : Case No. 20000034-CA
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant/Appellant Leslie Gene Loya ("Appellant" or "Leslie") was convicted of
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (1999). A copy
of the judgment is in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue Presented for Review. The motel where Appellant was staying had a
practice of extending an individual's stay beyond check-out time if the individual
communicated with the management. Appellant spoke to the manager prior to check-out
time and was told that she needed to be out of the room by 2:00 p.m. The issue presented
in this case is whether police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered
Appellant's motel room without a warrant at 1:30 p.m.. after check-out time but while
Appellant remained in the room packing her belongings.
Standard of Review. '"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous."" State v. Wells. 928 P. 2d 386. 388 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting State v.
Davis. 821 P. 2d 9. 11 (EUah App. 1991). "The trial court's legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to a trial judge's application
of the legal standard to the facts.'" Wells. 928 P. 2d at 388 (quoting State v. Moreno. 910
P. 2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.). cert, denied, 916 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1996)).
Preservation of the Argument. This issue was preserved by Appellant's motion to
suppress. R. 24-27. The issue is properly before this Court since Appellant entered a
conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Ut. R. Crim. P. 11 and State v. Scry. 758 P. 2d 935.
937-39 (Utah App. 1988), reserving her right to appeal the adverse ruling on her motion.
R. 50.
RELEVANT STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed August 12, 1999. the stale charged Eeslie with five counts
of possession of a forged check, a third degree felonv. in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S76-6-502 (1999). R. 3-5. On October 18. 1999. Appellant tiled a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence Sei/cd in Warrantless Entry of Hotel Room." R. 24. The trial court held a
hearing on the motion to suppress on October 25. 1999. R. 9E Hie trial court denied the
motion. R. 47. On October 29. 1999. the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. A eop\ of the findings and conclusions is in Addendum B. On
November 24. 1999. prior to entry of judgment. Appellant moved to amend the findings
of fact. R. 65-o. A copy of "Dclcndant's Proposed Amendment to Findings of Facl and
Conclusions of Law" is in Addendum C. The trial judge granted Appellant's proposed
amendment -2 and denied the proposed amendment f; E R. 72; see Addenda A. B. and C.
On October 29. 1999, Eeslie conditionally pleaded guilty to one count of
possession ot a forged cheek, a third degree felonv. in violation of I Hah Code Ann. $ 76-
6-502 {1999). Pursuant to that conditional plea. I eslie reserved her right to appeal the
adverse ruling on her motion to suppress evidence. R. 49. On December 17. 1999. the
trial court sentenced Appellant and entered judgment. R. 70-2. Appellant filed a timelv
notice of appeal on January 6. 2000.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On ,lul\ 3 E 1999. Leslie1 rented hotel room number 33 1 at the Suburban Eodsie.
[ I eslie checked into the room as Eeslie Wallers. R. 91:7. Margie Hathenbruck.
the manager of the Suburban Lodge, identified Appellant as the Eeslie Walters who
rented room 33 1 from July 31 through August 7. E>99. R. 91:12-13. Walters is
Appellant's married name. Presentence Report at IE
located at. 151 West 7200 South in Midvale. Utah. R. 91:6-7. Eeslie rented the room
until August 7. IlW9. R. 9]. I2. Eeslie was the only authorized guest for that room.
R. 91:7. 14.
Check-out time for a room at the Suburban I odge is I 1:00 a.m. R. 91:7. 'I he
motel office closes at 2:00 p.m. on weekends. R. c>l :7. If someone plans to sta\ for
another da\ on a weekend, he or she must have paid prior to 2:00 p.m. R. 91:7.
On the morning of August 7. 1999. the day on which Eeslie was scheduled to
check out. Eeslie went to the office and talked with Margie llathenbruck. the manager of
the Suburban Lodge. R. 91:6. 13. Eeslie needed additional time to get out of the room
and may have indicated to Ms. llathenbruck that she was trying to rent the room for
another day. R. 91:13. 22. Although the manager testified that someone needs to pav tor
an additional day by 2:00 p.m. if s he plans to Mav for another da\ on a weekend, she also
testified thai people are supposed to be out by 11:()() a.m. or pav bv 1I:()() a.m. R. 91:7.
13. Ms. llathenbruck acknowledged that the motel is usually "rcallv lenient at working
with people if they want to pay the next day and stuff... ." R. 91:18. In fact, as lon« as
people communicate with the management, the motel is very tlexible about the check-out
time and allows people to stay beyond the time for which thev have actuallv paid.
R. 91 :[9. Ms. I lalhenbruck did not indicate details but thought that something had
happened which made her want lo get Leslie out the room. R. 91:18.
Regardless of whether the general rule is that one must pav b\ I 1:()0 a m. or
2:00 p.m. in order to stav an additional dav. the manager acknowledged that Eeslie had
talked to her about extending the lime, and Ms. I lathenbruek "ma\ have extended that
time." R. 91:13. While Ms. Ilathenbruek could not remember the exact com creation she
had with Eeslie. Ms. Hathenbruck testified further that "(w]e usuallv give them a one-
hour grace period, but I did sa\ that we close at 2:00 that day and we most definitelv had
to be out before then." R. 91:13: see Addendum I) containing R. 91:13.
Although Ms. Hathenbruck testified that she "did say that we close at 2:00 that day
and [Leslie] most definitelv had to be out |of the room] before then" (R. 91:13). she also
testified that "some time alter 11:00 a.m.." she expected Leslie to be out of the room.
R. 91:14. Around 1:00 p.m. on August 7. 1999. Ms. Hathenbruck went up to room 331.
R. 91:14. Ms. llathenbruck testified that she "knocked on the door, expecting the room to
beemptv." R.91:14. Instead. Leslie's mother came to the door. R.91:14.
Ms. Ilathenbruek testified that she told Leslie and her mother that they needed to
get out. that she thought they had already left, and that she needed them to get out si) that
she could close the office. R. 91:15. Ms. Hathenbruck told Leslie and her mother they
needed to be out of the room by 2:00 p.m. R. 91:16. 23. Ms. Hathenbruck testified
further that she had "been pretty much working with them all dav. saying that, you know,
they needed to be out by 2:00." R. 91:23.
Eeslie was busy trying to get out. and Ms. Ilathenbruek could tell that Eeslie was
tr\ing to cooperate. R. 91:15. There were backpacks and bags on the bed. and Eeslie was
trying to put her things in them. R. 91:24. Ms. 1lathenbruek did not notice anythiim in
the backpacks. R. 91:24. Leslie's mother told Ms. Ilathenbruek. "She's getting readv
and we'll get out when we're readv. this - my bov has gone to get boxes for her to pack."
R. 91:15. Ms. Hathenbruck told I eslie and her mother that she needed them out oflhe
room by 2:00 p.m.. and the mother responded "diat she didn't think thev could do it and
they'd be out of there when thev were out of there." R. 91:16.
Ms. I lathenbruek left the room and returned with the maintenance man. R. 9!: 16-
17. Her plan was to slay until their tilings were packed, "but the mother was not happy
with us being there and she was giving him a really hard time because he'd gone in the
room earlier... ." R. 91:17.
Ms. Ilathenbruek went down to the office where she called the police. R. 91:16.
I'he reason Ms. Ilathenbruek called the police was that as the conversation progressed.
the mother became nasty and slammed the door in Ms. Hathenbruck\s face. R. 91:16.
Ms. Hathenbruck testified that although she had been working with Eeslie all day and had
given her a 2:00 p.m. deadline for getting out. Ms. Hathenbruck decided to call the police
"when the mother said thai Ihey didiEt think that they would be ready to be out by 2:00
and that they'd be out when they was out." R. 91:23. Ms. Hathenbruck decided she had
to call the police because she needed to close the o\'i]ee by 2:00 p.m. R. 91:23-4.
The police arrived about 1:30 p.m. R. 91:25. Ms. Hathenbruck initially testified
that the officers went to room 331 bv themselves. R. 91:17. She then chanced her
testimony and stated that she thought one of the officers went up on his own, "then [she]
went up there with the other one." R. 91:17. She later testified that one of the officers
went upstairs while the other went to talk with her. R. 91:25.
While Ms. Hathenbruck was not sure whether the officers went upstairs without
her. she did remember that they went into the room on their own. R. 91:26. She could
not remember whether the officers asked for permission or whether she was with them
when thev initially knocked on the door. R. 91:25-6.
Officer Keith Volpe, who had been a Midvale City police officer for two years,
responded to the call along with Officer Proulx. R. 91:29. They had been told that there
was a customer problem at the motel. R. 91:29.
Officer Volpe testified that he and Officer Proulx went to the room together.
R. 91:30. The door to the room was open and Officer Volpe could see people in the
room. R. 91:31. Lie initiated contact with the manager, Ms. Hathenbruck. before entering
the room. R. 91:31.
According to Officer Volpe. Officer Proulx entered the room before him while
Officer Volpe spoke with Ms. Hathenbruck. apparently in the hall outside the room.
R. 91:3 3. 37. Leslie's mother, who was inside the room, kept interrupting and yelling.
R. 91:37-8. Because Leslie's mother was an annoyance, Officer Proulx "entered the
room and brought [Leslie's mother] to the far side of the room and explained to her that
she would have her turn to talk to [Officer Volpe] and that she just needed to keep quiet
until (Officer VolpeJ was finished with [Ms. Ilathenbruek]." R. 91:38.
The officers did not have a warrant. R. 91:32. They did not knock or ask for
permission to enter the room. R. 91:31. The reason they did not knock or ask for
pemiission was that they had been told that the occupants had paid up through 11:()() a.m.
and that the police had been called to make sure they left the room immediately.
R. 91:31 -2. Since check-out time was 11:()() a.m., the officers assumed they could just go
inside the room. R. 91:33. Officer Volpe could not recall whether the manager
mentioned the 2:00 p.m. deadline for vacating the room. R. 91:33. He did acknowledge,
however, that there had been some arrangements between Ms. llathenbruck and Leslie
prior to his arrival, but could not recall what they were. R. 91:33.
According to Officer Volpe, the manager called because Leslie was still in the
room and also because Leslie's mother had slammed the door in Ms. Hathenbruck's face.1
R. 91:35. Officer Volpe testified that he has responded to calls in the past where a person
has not vacated a motel room. R. 91:36. He indicated that in those cases, he usually
entered the room. R. 91:36. Ile stated further that, "[w]e normally - - we go to the door,
we knock on the door, explain to the people inside what we're there for, let them know
that they need to pack up and move out immediately." R.. 91:36.
2 Officer Volpe initially testified that the officers had been called because Leslie
was still in the room and because Leslie's mother had pushed Ms. Hathenbruck.
R. 91:34. Officer Volpe then retracted that testimonv after looking at his police report.
R. 91:35.
Lhe trial judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACL
1. That defendant was charged by Information with four counts of
Possession of a Forged Check and one count of Possession of a Forged
Writing, all Third Degree Felonies.
2. That defendant had rented Room 331. under the name Eeslie
Walters, at the Suburban Lodge of Midvale. 151 West 7200 South. Salt
Lake County.
3. That defendant was informed by Eodge Manager Margie
Hathenbr[u]ck that defendant must either pay rent for an additional day or
vacate the room on August 7. 1999. by 11:00 a.m., the specified hour to
vacate the room.
4. The Eodge Manager Hathenbr[u]ck told defendant that the former
was willing to give defendant some additional time to present the rent.
5. That by shortly alter 1:00 p.m.. Lodge Manager Hathenbr[u]ck
had not heard from defendant nor had defendant tendered the rent for an
additional dav.
6. That shortly after 1:00 p.m. on August 7, 1999. Lodge Manager
1Iathenbr[u]ck went to Room 33 1 expecting to find it vacant.
7. That when she arrived at Room 33 1. Eodge Manager
Hathenbr[u]ck found defendant and the latter's unregistered mother still in
possession of the room.
8. That defendant's mother informed Lodge Manager Hathenbr[u]ck
that defendant and she would vacate the room when they were readv to do
so.
9. That as Lodge Manager Hathenbr[u|ck left Room 331.
defendant's mother slammed the door.
10. That Lodge Manager Hathenbr[u]ck telephoned the Midvale
City Police Department.
I 1. That Officers Volpe and Proulx were dispatched to the Suburban
Eodge of Midvale.
1Ia. The officers' involvement occurred at 1:30 p.m.
12. That Eodge Manager IIathenbr|u]ck explained the situation with
defendant and her mother to the Midvale Police Officers.
13. Thai the officers went to Room 33 1 at the direction of Eodsie
Manager Hathenbr|u]ck. to assist in peacefully causing defendant and her
mother to vacate the room.
14. That the officers observed defendant and her mother in Room
33 I through an open door.
15. That the officers entered Room 33 1without asking permission
to do so from defendant nor did they have a search warrant in their
possession.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as a
matter oflaw. that defendant was a holdover tenant in Room 331. she had
no right to demand to remain and the Midvale Officers' warrantless entry
into the room was not unlawful.
R. 59-61.66, 72.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Eeslie had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room when the
officers entered without a warrant even though cheek-out time had passed. Based on her
conversations with the manager and the motel's past practices. Eeslie had a subjective
expectation that the room was hers until 2:00 p.m. That expectation was also objectively
reasonable in light of the motel's past practices and statements the manager made to
Leslie. A search protected h\ the Fourth Amendment occurred when the officers eniered
Leslie's mote! room without a warrant. Since the state failed to establish that probable
cause and exigent circumstances justified the search, all of the evidence seized from the
motel room must be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT. POLICE OFFICERS VIOI ATE!) APPELLAN 1 'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN 1HEY ENTERED 1ILR MOl PL ROOM
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
The Fourth Amendment to the I 'nited States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides:
The right of the people to he secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
""Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the [ | fourth
Amendment is directed.'" State v. Beavers. 859 P. 2d 9. 13 (Utah App. 1993)(quoting
{inited States v. I lnited States District Court. 407 U.S. 297. 3 13. 92 S.Ct. 2125.2134. 32
L. Ed. 2d 752 ( 1972)). "Consequenilv. warrantless searches and seizures within a home
or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances."
Beavers. 859 P. 2d at 13 (citing Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347. 357. 88 S. Ct. 507.
514. 19 U. E.d. 2d 576 (1967); Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573. 586-87. 100 S. Ct.
n
1371. 1380. 63 E. Ed. 2d 639 (1980): Stale v. Brown. 853 P. 2d 851. 855 (Utah 1992)).
While a motel room has characteristics which are different from a home, an
indiv idual who rents a motel room has a legitimate expectation of privacv which is akin
to that of a home. See Stoncr v. California . 376 I !.S. 483. 490, 84 S. Ct. 889. 893. 1 I E.
lid. 2d 856 (1964)(indicating that guest in a hotel room has the same constitutional
protection against search and seizure as a tenant of a house or the occupant of a boarding
room): Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293. 300-01. 87 S. Ct. 408. 413, 17 E. lid. 2d 374
( 1966)(citinu {inited States v. Jeffers. 342 U.S. 48. 72 S. Ct. 93. 96 E. Ed. 59 (1951)
(recognizing that fourth Amendment protection applies to guest in motel room); State v.
Austin. 584 P. 2d 853. 856 (Utah 1978)(the court's holding that a search of a motel room
is justified as being incident to arrest implicitly includes a recognition thai a warrant is
needed to search a motel room occupied by defendant unless an exception to warrant
requirement applies). When police officers who do not have a warrant enter a motel room
occupied by a guest, the Fourth Amendment is violated unless the state sustains its
"particularly heavv burden" of establishing that probable cause and exigent circumstances
or some other exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry. See Heavers. 859
P. 2d at 13-14 (citin» Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740. 749-50. 104 S. Ct. 2091. 2097.
80 E. lid. 2d 732 (1984): State v. Ramirez. 814 P. 2d 1131. I133 (Utah App. 1991)).
While a motel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacv in his or her room.
and "it is settled that a motel guest is entitled to constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches of his or her room" ( 1lnited States v. Owens. 782 L. 2d 146. 149
(10lh Cir. 198m). that expectation of privacv which triggers the fourth Amendment
protection "is not unlimited." United States v. Kitchens. 1 (4 F. 3d 29. 31 (4:l1 Cir. 1997).
lor example, once an individual has checked out of a room, s he no lonaer has a
reasonable expectation of privacv in the room. See Kitchens. 114 F. 3d at 3 1 (further
citations omitted).
In Kitchens, the court outlined the test for determining whether a motel guest has a
legitimate expectation of privacv'. i.e. standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim as: (1)
whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacv. and (2) whether that
expectation was reasonable. Kitchens. 114 F. 3d at 3 1-2 (citing Katz. 389 U.S. 347
(Harlan. J., concurring)). Application of this test in determining whether an individual
had a reasonable expectation of privacv in a motel room demonstrates that in some
circumstances, an individual will have a reasonable expectation of privacv in a motel
room even after check-out time. See Kitchens. 1 14 F. 3d at 32: United States v. Watson.
"S3 L. Supp. 258. 263 (L.I). Va. 1992): Owens. 782 F. 2d at 150.
In Owens, the court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the motel room even though police officers conducted the search after check
out time. Owens. 782 F. 2d at I50. The court reasoned that Owens had a subjective
expectation of privacv' in the room as demonstrated by his testimonv- that he believed that
his deposit made him a weekly tenant, and by Owens "vigorous attempts to persuade the
police not to enter his room... ." EF at I50. Furthermore, that expectation was reasonable
since he had paid a large deposit and in the past had staved in the room after check-out
time without there being any consequences. UI In fact, the manager testified that it was
the motel's practice to check with guests who stayed past check-out time to determine
whether they intended to stay an additional day. hf Because the defendant held a
subjective expectation of privacv which was reasonable given the motel's past practice.
the court held that the officers violated the fourth Amendment when thev conducted a
warrantless search which did not fit within the exceptions to the warrant requirement, kh
at 153.
I he court in Watson likewise concluded that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacv" in a hotel room even though it was past check-out time. Watson.
783 F. Supp. at 263. In Watson, officers conducted a warrantless search of \\ atsoiTs
hotel room at about 10:15 p.m. Watson had been staving in the room for several davs and
had paid for the room as late as 10:09 p.m. on previous days. The court reasoned that
Watson had a reasonable expectation of privacv where his belongings were still in the
room and the hotel had been lax in enforcing the check-out policy in the past. EL
In the present case. I eslie had a reasonable expectation of privacv in the motel
room even though check-out time had passed. The facts show that Eeslie held a
subjective expectation of privacy in the room, and that such expectation was reasonable in
light of Ms. I lathenbruek \s extension of (lie time in which Eeslie could remain in the
14
room and the moteEs practice of allowing a renters to stay bevond the 11:00 a.m. check
out time. R. 91:18 (motel is usually lenient in working with people who want to pav the
next day): 91:18-19 (management will let people pay the next dav if they are in
communication with manager): 91:13 (manager required Eeslie to be out bv 2:00 p.m.).
As a threshold mailer, the trial court's findings require scrutinv. The trial court
found that the manager told Leslie that she "must either pav rent for an additional dav or
vacate the room ...by 11:00 a.m." R. 60 (Finding <:3). Although Ms. Hathenbruck did
testifv that she talked with Eeslie sometime prior to 11:00 a.m. on August 7 and told
Leslie she had to pay or get out of the room, she did not direeth state that on August 7.
she told Leslie she had to pay or be out by 11:00 a.m. R. 91:13. Instead.
Ms. Ilathenbruek indicated that while people are gencralh supposed to pav or be out bv
11:00 a.m.. she may have extended Leslie's time.
Prosecutor: Did you at that time, tell her that she had to pav or be
out of the room?
Ms. Hathenbruck: Yes. I did.
Prosecutor: And by what time was she to be out?
Ms. Hathenbruck: Well, actually, they're supposed to be out at I 1:00 or
pav by 11:00. She had come down to talk to me and I
may have extended that time. We usually giv e them a
one-hour grace period, but 1 did say that we close at
2:00 that day and we most definitely had to be out
before then.
R. 91:13. Ms. Hathenbruck also testified that when a person rents a room, he or she is
told that check-out time is '1:00 a.m. RAM:8.
1he trial judge's finding ^3 that Ms. Ilathenbruek told I.eslie she must pav or be
out by 11:()() is supported by the evidence only if it refers to the information which was
conveyed to 1 eslie when she checked into the motel several davs before the search. The
ev idence does not demonstrate that when Ms. Ilathenbruek spoke to I.eslie prior to check
out time on August 7. Ms. I lathenbruek informed I.eslie thai she must be out bv 11:()() if
she did not pay for another da\. Instead, the evidence establishes that Ms. 1lathenbruek
extended the lime of Leslie's stav up to 2:00 p.m.
Finding ;'/3. when read in conjunction with finding &4. clarifies that
Ms. Ilathenbruek did not require Eeslie to be out of the room by 11:00 a.m. on August T
Instead. Ms. llathenbruck gave Leslie additional time. In tact, the record demonstrates
that Ms. Hathenbruck informed Leslie that she must be out of the room bv 2:00 p.m.
when the office was to close. R. 91:7 (person must pay prior to 2:00 p.m. to stav an
additional dav); 91:13 (Eeslie talked to Ms. Hathenbruck prior to 11:()() a.m. because she
needed additional time to get out of the room): 91:13 (Ms. Hathenbruck acknowledges
that she may have extended the time, but that she did say that they closed at 2:00 p.m. and
Leslie detinitelv was to be out by then): 91:15-16 (Ms. Hathenbruck told Leslie and her
mother they needed to be out of the room by 2:00 and Leslie's mother said she did not
think thev could tlo it): 91:18 (management is usually lenient in working with people who
want to pay the next day: Ms. llathenbruck thouuht something had irone on which made
her want to get Eeslie out of the room). Io the extent finding ^3 is interpreted to mean
that on August 7 when Leslie talked with Ms. llathenbruck about staving past check-out.
Ms. Ilathenbruek told her she must pav or he out by 11:()(). that finding is clearlv
erroneous.
1he evidence in this case demonstrates that I eslie had a subjective expectation of
privacv in the room at the time the police officers entered, and that such expectation was
reasonable. Leslie's subjective expectation of privacv is demonstrated bv her continued
The marshaled evidence in support of a finding that Ms. Hathenbruck told Leslie
she had to be out by 11:00 a.m. on August 7 is as follows:
1. People are told when thev check in that check-out time is 11:00 a.m. R. 91:8.
2. Leslie talked to Ms. Hathenbruck prior to I I:()() a.m.. and Ms. Ilathenbruek
told I eslie she had to pa> or get out. R. 91:13.
3. Check-out time was 11:00 a.m. R. 91:13.
4. Ms. Hathenbruck was surprised to find Leslie in the room when
Ms. Ilathenbruek went to the room shortly after 1:()() p.m. R. 91:15.
This evidence does not establish that Ms. Ilathenbruek required Eeslie to be out bv
11:00 a.m. on August 7. Instead, it establishes only that the check-out time was
11:00 a.m. and that Ms. Ilathenbruek told Leslie that she would have to pav or get out at
some point. Moreover, the evidence cannot be read in a vacuum. When this testimonv is
considered in context with the rest of Ms. Hathenbruek's testimonv. it is clear that
Ms. Hathenbruck extended Leslie's time to 2:00 p.m.
Appellant submitted a proposed finding ~1 which stated. "Lodge Manager. Mamie
Hathenbr[u]ck. testified that on the date m question. 2:00 p.m. was the focal point and the
time with which she was concerned." R. 66. The trial judge rejected this finding.
R. 92:3. 72. If that rejection were interpreted as a finding that Ms. Hathenbruck did not
extend the time to 2:00 p.m.. such a finding would be clearly erroneous. The marshaled
ev idence set forth above applies to such a finding and is insufficient to support a
determination that the time was not extended to 7:00 p.m. In addition, to find that the
time was not extended to 2:00 p.m. ignores the totalin of the ev idence.
occupancy, the fact that her belongings were still in the room, her conversation with the
manager indicating that she needed more time, and the manager's recognition that she
may have extended the time, but that she made it clear that I eslie had to be out bv
2:00 p.m. Since the officers went to the room at about 1:30 p.m. (R. 91:25). Leslie had a
subjective expectation of privacv in the room when the officers arrived.
Leslie's expectation of privacv was reasonable in light of the motel's past practices
and the statements Ms. 1lathenbruek matte to Leslie when she requested that the time be
extended. Ms. Ilathenbruck's testimony established that the motel was in the practice of
extending a person's stay bevond check-out time when the indiv idual discussed the matter
with the manager. R. 91:18-19. Ms. 1lathenbruek testified that the motel was usuallv
"reallv lenient" about extending stays and allowed people to pav the next dav if thev
communicated with management. R. 91:18-19. Ms. llathenbruck acknowledged that
Leslie might have told her that Leslie was thinking about renting the room ior another
dav . R. 91:22. When asked whether she had allowed Eeslie to stay a previous night
without paving. Ms. Hathenbruck responded. "Em not sure." R. 91:19. Is. Hathenbruck
also testified that she told people thai check-out lime was 11:00 a.m. and that if Leslie
asked to stav1 another day. Ms. Hathenbruck "would have told her. like I do everv miest.
that they need to pay for the day in advance il ;hey Ve going to stav. whether it be cash or
credit card" (R. 91:26). When this testimonv' is considered in conjunction with
Ms. I lathenbruck's testimonv reirardin« the motel's lenienev in extending stavs. it is
evident that despite the existence of a check-out time, the motel had a practice of allowinu
occupants to stav past the check-out time when people discuss the matter with
management.
Ms. Flathenbruck's discussions with Leslie further demonstrate that Leslie's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. Although Leslie was informed of the 11:00 a.m.
cheek-out time when she checked in. when Leslie went to talk to Ms. Hathenbruck on
August 7 about staving bevond that time. Ms. Hathenbruck mav have extended the time
but made it clear Leslie had to he out by 2:00 p.m. R. 91:13. Moreover.
Ms. Hathenbruck was not sure whether she had allowed Leslie to stay a previous night
without paying in advance, but was usually very lenient in allowing guests to stay even
when they had not paid. R. 91:18-9. A consideration of the totality of Ms. Hathenbruck's
testimony establishes that Ms. Hathenbruck allowed Leslie to stay until 2:00 p.m. on
August 7. In this ease where Leslie discussed her need for extended time with the
manager and the manager "may have extended the lime" but told Leslie she must be out
by 2:00 p.m.. Eeslie had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room when the
officers entered at 1:30 p.m.
Ms. Hathenbruck's comment that she expected Leslie to be gone when
Ms. Hathenbruck went to the room a little after 1:()() p.m. (R. 91: 14) does not undermine
the reasonableness of Leslie's expectation of privacv in the room until 2:00 p.m.
Ms. Hathenbruck (old Leslie that she definitely needed to be out by 2:00 p.m. R. 91:13.
1>6. Eater, when Ms. Ilai'henhruck was surprised to see that Leslie was siill in the
room. Ms. I lathenbruek told I,eslie and her mother that Ms. I lathenbruek "needed them to
be (nit of there bv 2:00." R. 91:16. (liven that Ms. llathenbruck told Eeslie that she had
until 2:00 p.m. to get out of the room, anv thoughts bv Ms. I lathenbruek that Leslie misiht
leave earlier than 2:00 p.m. were purelv subjective and not based on the nature of the
communication to Eeslie.
Likewise. Ms. Hathenbruck's decision to call the police after Leslie's mother told
Ms. Ilathenbruek she did not think thev would be out by 2:00 p.m. and slammed the door
did not undermine the reasonableness of Leslie's expectation of privacv in the room.
I eslie had been told she had until 2:00 p.m. to gel out of the room. Although
Ms. Ilathenbruek testified dial she expected Leslie to be gone when Ms. Ilathenbruek
went to the room at a little after 1:00 p.m., that expectation was not based on anything
communicated to or by Leslie. Moreover, when Ms. Hathenbruck went to the room, she
again communicated to Leslie that Eeslie must be out by 2:00 p.m. R, 91:16. While
Ms. Hathenbruck clearly wanted Eeslie out bv 2:00 p.m.. Eeslie could reasonablv expect
privacy in the room until that time.
Officer Volpe's testimony also failed to establish that Leslie did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The officers talked to the manager and
were told that a guest remained in a room after check-out time. R. 91:33. The officer
could not recall whether Ms. Ilathenbruek told him that there was a 2:00 p.m. time when
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the otiice closed. R. 91:33. He also could not remember whether the manager told him
that Eeslie could stay until 2:00 p.m. R. 91:33. (Officer Volpe did know, however, that
M[t |here were some arrangements made between the manger and Ms. Eova prior to |his|
arrival." R. 91:33. Since the state had the burden ofestablishing the proprietv of this
warrantless search, the officer's failure to remember these details coupled with his
memory that there was some arrangement with Eeslie demonstrates that the state did not
establish that the officer entered the room after Leslie's right to be there had terminated.
Ihe evidence establishes that Leslie had a reasonable expectation of privacv when
the officers entered her room. The trial court's conclusion to the contrarv was incorrect
and must be overturned.
Since Leslie had a reasonable expectation of privacv' in her motel room, the fourth
Amendment protection was triggered when the officers crossed the threshold of her room.
See Heavers. 859 ['.2d at 13. "|Warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other
private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." Beavers. 859
P.2d at 13 (citing Katz. 389 E.S. at 357. S8 S. Ct. at 514. 19 E. Ed. 2d 576: Pavton 445
U.S. at 586-87, 100 S. Ct. at 1380.63 E. Ed. 2d 639; Brown. 853 P.2d 851)). The state
has a heavy burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement justified
the police officers" entry into the room in order to uphold the search which was based on
contraband viewed by police officers after thev entered the room. In this case, the state
tailed to sustain its burden of establishing that probable cause and exigent circumstances
justified the entry.
Prior to entry into the room, the police officers did not have probable cause to
believe Eeslie had committed a crime or probable cause to search the motel room. Since
a holdover tenant in some circumstances has a continued expectation of privacv in a
motel room, information from the manager that check-out time was 11:()() a.m. was
insufficient to establish probable cause. In fact, the officers knew that some sort of
arrangements had been mace with Leslie. The officer's inabilitv to recall the details of
those arrangements as well as his inabilitv to remember whether Ms. I lathenbruek told
him that she had extended the deadline to 2:00 p.m. works against the state since it was
the state's burden to establish that the officers had probable cause when thev entered.
Fhe evidence in this case indicates that the officers disregarded the question of whether
Leslie's time had been extended because Ihey believed that the check-out time standing
alone deprived Eeslie of a reasonable expectation of privacv in the motel room. The
officers" incorrect understanding of the law and failure to consider or remember all of the
information fails to demonstrate that thev had probable cause to enter the motel room.
See generally Stale v. friesen. 378 I hah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah App. 1999)< officer must
have reasonable suspicion regarding conduct of person, not nature of the law ).
The behavior of Leslie's mother likewise did not establish probable cause for the
officers to enter the room. Leslie's mother had an argument with the manager and
slammed the door in her face. R. 91:3>. While unpleasant, such behavior is not criminal.
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Officer Volpe testified that Officer Proulx entered the room because Leslie's mother was
veiling and interrupting while the officers were trying to talk to Ms. I lathenbruek.
R. 91:37. Officer Proulx entered the room and took the mother to the other side of the
room and talked to her. R. 91:38. The annovancc caused bv the interruptions of Leslie's
mother could have been ailev ialed by a far less intrusive approach—walking down the hall
with Ms. Ilathenbruek lo conduct the interv iew . Annoying behavior does not establish
probable cause.4
Nor did exigent circumstances exist. Exigent circumstances include circumstances
where "'the delay to obtain a search warrant would risk "phvsical harm to the officers or
other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, [or] escape of the suspect."'" State v.
Yoder. 935 P.2d 534. 540 (Utah App. 1997Meiting Beavers. 859 P.2d at 17 (citations
omitted)). In this ease, there was no suggestion that the officers miuht be harmed or
evidence destroyed if officers were to obtain a warrant. Nor did the officers have a
suspect who might escape. Indeed, the officers entered only because thev had an
incorrect understanding as to whether Leslie had a reasonable expectation of privacv in
the room and not because ofexiuent circumstances. The state therefore did not sustain its
4'Fhe tact that Leslie's mother was in the room adds nothing to the consideration
of whether the officers had probable cause to enter the room. While Leslie's mother was
not registered as a guest, it is not clear from the facts whether she was staving in room or
simply helping Eeslie pack. Moreover, failure to register a miest is not a crime.
heavv burden of establishing exigent circumstances which justified this search/
Leslie had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her motel room even thoimh il
was past check-out time. Since the state did not establish that probable cause ov that
exigent circumstances justified the intrusion, the officers' entrv into Leslie's motel room
violated the fourth Amendment. All of the fruits seized as the result of this illegal entrv.
i.e. all of the items viewed alter the police officers entered the room and all of the items
subsequentlv' sei/cd. must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. I [niled Stales. 371 U.S. 471. 487-
U. 83 S. Ct. 407.417. 9 E. Ed. 2d 441 (]%3).
CONCLlkSlON
The trial court committed reversible error ,;i denying Appellant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from her motel room. Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court overturn her conv iction and remand the case for a new trial absent the ille»allv
seized evidence.
SE'BMII fid) this y-& day of April. 2000.
JOANC.WATI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Ms. 1lathenbruek"s desire to close the office by 2:00 p.m. also did not create an
exigent circumstance allowing officers to dispense with the warrant requirement.
Inconvenience to a third parly docs not rise to the level required to condone a warrantless
intrusion.
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RONALD S, IE.UNO
Attorney for Defendant Appellant
CER1U ICAIT. Ol- DEI 1VERY
I. JOAN C. WAIT, herein certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals. 450 South State. 5" floor. P. O. Box
140230. Salt Fake City. Etah 841 14-0230. and four copies to the Utah Attornev General's
Office. Heber M. Wells Building. 160 East 300 South. 6th Floor. P. O. Box 140854. Salt
Lake City. Utah 84114-0854. this VU^dav of April. 2000.
JOAN C. WATT
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this day of April. 2000.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs .
LESLIE GENE LOYA,
Defendant.
Custody: Pre-Trial Services
MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 991916283 FS
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Date: December 17, 1999
PRESENT
Clerk: cindyb
Prosecutor: UPDEGROVE, KENNETH R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 5, 1969
Video
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10:09-10:16
CHARGES
1. POSSESS FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/29/1999 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESS FORGERY
WRITING-'DEVICE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
ar. indeterminate term cf not to exceed five years in the Utah State
The pr:son term is suspended.
K.r^ff^6 -'^cnent. Commitment
991916283 JDioeguo
LCYA, LESLIE GEN JD
10
V".
Case No: 991916283
Date: Dec 17, 1999
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Restitution: Amount: $898.00
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Paroie.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to obtain any prescriptions without prior knowledge of
probation officer.
Pay restitution in regular monthly payments as determined by Adult
Probation and Parole. Pay recoupment fee as ordered within
probation term.
Enter into and successfully complete a substance abuse treatment
program through Cornerstone Counseling Center or Valley Mental
Health as recommended by Adult Probation and Parole.
Undergo a mental health evaluation through Valley Mental Health or
other agency as recommended by Adult Probation and Parole and
Page 2
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Case No: 991916283
Date: Dec 17, 1999
comply 'with any recommended course of treatment.
Defendant's proposed amendment si is denied and defendant's
proposed amendment #2 is accepted re the Motion to Suppress.
Counsel for the State to prepare the amended findings.
Dated this /Tf^dav cf //j£^ #9 ,, .r £ , ,^.^w
Page 3 (last;
REDERJCK; .,..-..,-
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ADDENDUMH
DAVID L. YOCOM
District Attornev for Salt Lake Countv
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE. 4931 '
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South. Smte 300
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
•y.
FILED DISTRICT C8UIT
Third Judicial District
OCT 2 9 :S53
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Plaintiff, CONCLUSION OF LAW
-vs-
Case No. 991916283FS
LESLIEGENELOYA,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized In Warrantless Entry of Hotel Room,
filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on October 25. 1999. at
1:30 p.m. Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Ronald S. Fujino. Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove. Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attorney.
The Motion w:as submitted to the Court. Being fully advised in the premises the Court
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law:
Findings of fact
1. That defendant was charged by Information with four counts of Possession of a
Forged Check and one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, all Third Degree Felonies.
2. That defendant had rented Room 331, under the name Leslie Walters, at the
Suburban Lodue of Midvale, 151 West 7200 South. Salt Lake County.
^
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 991916283 FS
Page 2
3. That defendant was informed by Lodge Manager Margie Hathenbroek that
defendant must either pay rent for an additional day or vacate the room on August 7, 1999, by
11:00 a.m.. the specified hour to vacate the room.
4. That Lodge Manager Hathenbroek told defendant that the former was willing to
give defendant some additional time to present the rent.
5. I'hat by shortly after 1:00 p.m.. Lodge Manager Hathenbroek had not heard from
defendant nor had defendant .endered the rent for an additional dav.
6. That shortly after 3:00 p.m. on August 7. 1999. Lodge Manager Hathenbroek
went to Room 53 1 expecting to find it vacant.
7. That when she arrived at Room 331. Lodge Manager Hathenbroek found
defendant and the latter*s unregistered mother still in possession of the room.
8. That defendants mother informed Lodge Manager Hathenbroek that defendant
and she would vacate the room when they were readv to do so.
9. That as Lodge Manager Hathenbroek left Room 331. defendant's mother
slammed the room door.
10. That Lodge Manager Hathenbroek telephoned the Midvale City Police
Department.
11. That Officers Volpe and Proulx were dispatched to the Suburban Lodge oi"
Midvale.
12. That Lodge Manager Hathebrock explained the situation with defendant and her
mother to the Midvale Police Officers.
13 That the officers went to Room 33 1at the direction of Lodge Manager
Hathenbroek. to assist in peacefully causing defendant and her mother to vacate the room.
IcO
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14. That the officers observed defendant and her mother in Room 331 through an
open door.
15. That the officers entered Room 331 without asking permission to do so from
defendant not did they have a search warrant in their possession.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as a matter of law. that
defendant was a holdover tenant in Room 331. she had no right to demand to remain and the
Midvale Officers' warrantless entry into the room was not unlawful.
DATED this i^Mavof ( \)jC/ . 1999.
Approved as to form:
Ronald S. Fujino
Counsel for Defendant
HONOR:KB^EJ/__7 . __
Third pistricTCourt j/udize \f
u>\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy o( the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusion Of Law was delivered to Ronald S. Fujino. Counsel for Defendant LESLIE GENE
LOYA, at Sail Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 Fast 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on theyflfttday of October, 1999.
•/WHllkJtttfV
6»;
*•.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
F'L"lymmcum
Third Judicial District
°Ci" 2s .'sgg
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vs- Case No. 991916283FS
LESLIE GENE LOYA, Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact
and the Conclusion of Law based thereon;
HEREBY ORDERS that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized In Warrantless
Entry of Hotel Room is denied.
DATED this day of ,1999.
BY THE COURT:
U3
ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to
Ronald S. Fujino, Counsel for Defendant LESLIE GENE LOYA, at Salt Lake Legal Deferler
Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on thepftlday of
October, 1999.
•/hMil/itiM'
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ADDENDUM C
RONALD S. FUJINO, #5387
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
M^r
STATE OF UTAH, DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO THE FINDING OF FACT
Plaintiff, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
LESLIE GENE LOYA, Case No. 9919162^83FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, LESLIE GENE LOYA, by and through counsel,
RONALD S. FUJINO, and hereby proposes the following amendments to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Although the testimony for the Motion to Suppress
proceeding is a part of the record', in an effort to avoid a future remand of this case,
Ms. Loya seeks to clarify the facts as follows:
] As noted at the conditional plea proceeding, held October 29. 1999. Ms. Loya took
issue with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. but wanted to listen to the recorded
testimony: however, she has been unable to obtain the record. She does not know whether the
court signed the submitted Findings and Conclusions,and factual clarification is required before
sentencing. Accordingly, she respectfully submits the facts from memory and notes for the
State's and the Court's consideration.
l&'
1) Lodge Manager, Margie Hathenbroek, testified that on the date in
question, 2:00 p.m. was the focal point and the time with which she was concerned.
2) On the date in question, the officers' involvement occurred at
approximately 1:30 p.m.
DATED this ^\ day of November, 1999.
D^S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attonrey, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this <^7 day of November,
1999.
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ADDENDUM D
1 A That's her right there in the light-colored
2 shirt.
3 MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the
4 record reflect that the witness has identified the
5 defendant?
6 THE COURT: Yes, it may.
7 Q (By Mr. Updegrove) Now, at this point, I'll
8 start using the name Leslie Loya.
9 Did Ms. Loya come down to you prior to 11:00
10 a.m. on the 7th to talk about further rental of the room?
11 A I don't remember our—our exact conversation.
12 I think she needed time to get out of the room, if I
13 remember right.
14 Q Now, was this on the morning of the 7th?
15 A That's correct.
16 Q Did you at that time, tell her that she had to
17 pay or be out of the room?
18 A Yes. I did.
19 Q And by what time was she to be out?
20 A Well, actually, they're supposed to be out at
21 11:00 or pay by 11:00. She had come down to talk to me
22 and I may have extended that time. We usually give them
23 a one-hour grace period, but I did say that we close at
24 2:00 that day and we most definitely had to be out before
then.
13
